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THE FEDERAL MAIL FRAUD STATUTE: THE
GOVERNMENT'S COLT 45 RENDERS NORBY
WALTERS AND LLOYD BLOOM
AGENTS OF MISFORTUNE
I. INTRODUCTION
In a current trend which threatens the entire agency profession,
sports agents are finding themselves subject to criminal prosecution in
situations where they have not violated criminal legislation. Specifically,
agents have faced criminal charges' as a result of violating National Col-
legiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") regulations.2
It is a scene which has become increasingly familiar to the campuses
of America's major colleges and universities: a sports agent3 visits a
school with a successful sports program and seeks out its most promising
student-athletes.4 The agent makes this visit to gain an advantage over
fellow agents in the competitive race to represent those precious few ath-
letes who are destined for professional careers in the National Football
League ("NFL"). The agent promises the player future millions' in the
NFL and assures the athlete that his present financial and material needs
will be satisfied.6 In exchange, the student is to sign a representation
1. This casenote will focus upon the use of the federal mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C.
§ 1341) as a means of subjecting agents to accountability.
2. See, e.g., Abernethy v. State, 545 So.2d 185 (Ala. Ct. App. 1988).
3. An agent is defined as "[o]ne who acts for or in place of another by authority from
him," or "[o]ne who deals not only with things... but with persons, using his own discretion
as to means, and frequently establishing contractual relations between his principal and third
persons," or "[a] business representative, whose function is to bring about, modify, affect...
contractual obligations between principal and third persons." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59
(5th ed. 1979). A sports agent is any person who represents, or attempts to represent, in
negotiation of professional sports services contracts professional athletes or potential profes-
sional athletes in any sport. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS §§ 3.17-
.19 (1979 & Supp. 1985); Id. § 320 (Supp. 1985); Comment, The Agent-Athlete Relationship In
Professional And Amateur Sports: The Inherent Potential For Abuse And The Need For Regula-
tion, 30 BUFFALO LAW REV. 815 (1981).
4. The National Collegiate Athletic Association defines a student-athlete as "a student
whose matriculation was solicited by a member of the athletic staff or other representative of
athletics interests with a view toward the student's ultimate participation in the intercollegiate
athletics program." NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 1 0.1. 1.
5. Players are able to capitalize on large advertising budgets by endorsing particular
products. In addition, it is not uncommon for athletes to receive annual salaries of more than
one million dollars to play professional sports. Dunn, Regulation Of Sports Agents: Since at
First It Hasn't Succeeded, Try Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 1031, 1033 (July 1988)
[hereinafter Dunn, Regulation Of Sports Agents].
6. Sports agents' contracts with student-athletes included bonuses and monthly pay-
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contract7 with the agent, a clear violation of NCAA regulations,' which
terminates his eligibility to continue participating in college athletics.9
Millions of dollars in advertising revenue are available to college
football programs, due largely to the American public's fascination with
star athletes. 0 To take advantage of this revenue, it is necessary for uni-
versities to attract star players and maintain a successful athletic pro-
gram." The success of the program and the school's ability to realize the
substantial profits available to it is threatened when students become in-
eligible to participate in the school's athletic program.
With millions of dollars at stake, the threat of losing star athletes
because of agent-induced ineligibility has forced universities to be in-
creasingly vigilant in preventing violations that can jeopardize a poten-
tially lucrative season. In the absence of specific legislation to control
agent activity, universities are turning to broad criminal statutes to find a
means of controlling agent activity on their campuses. 12 By discouraging
the representation of star student-athletes, universities are insuring that
students will be eligible to participate in college sports, helping to gener-
ate revenue.13 In maintaining the eligibility of these young athletes, the
university protects its prospects for a lucrative athletic program.14 Thus,
ments. One such contract called for the student-athlete to receive $500 a month, $1,000
Christmas bonus, a $200 Thanksgiving bonus and disability insurance. Another provided a
$75 bonus for each touchdown scored. Agent: Players' Contracts Had Bonuses f $175 To
$J,100, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 1987, at C9, col. 3.
7. A representation contract enables the agent to perform various functions such as
player contract negotiations; obtaining, reviewing and negotiating contracts; investment advice
and income management; and legal and tax counseling. Sobel, The Regulation Of Sports
Agents. An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 701 (1987).
8. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 1 (a), (c), states in pertinent part: (a) An individual shall not
be eligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if the individual: (1) Takes or has taken
pay, or has accepted the promise of pay, in any form, for participation in that sport, including
the promise of pay when such pay is to be received following completion of the intercollegiate
career; or (2) Has entered into an agreement of any kind to compete in professional athletics in
that sport or to negotiate a professional contract in that sport .... (c) Any individual who
contracts or who has ever contracted orally or in writing to be represented by an agent in the
marketing of the individual's athletic ability or reputation in a sport no longer shall be eligible
for intercollegiate athletics in that sport. Id.
9. Id.
10. Advertisers spend more than $100 million yearly to obtain commercial air time during
college sporting events. See Dunn, Regulation Of Sports Agents, supra note 5, at 1033 n. 17.
11. Woods and Mills, Tortious Interference With An Athletic Scholarship: A University's
Remedy For The Unscrupulous Agent, 40 ALA. L. REV. 141, 168-69 (1988).
12. See, e.g., State v. Abernethy 545 So.2d 185 (Ala. Ct. App. 1988); United States v.
Walters and Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Il. 1989).
13. Woods and Mills, Tortious Interference With An Athletic Scholarship: A University's
Remedy For The Unscrupulous Agent, 40 ALA. L. REV. at 160-61 (1988).
14. Id.
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an agent who violates NCAA regulations in his rush to obtain clients
may be one step away from an unexpected mail fraud conviction.
The preceding scenario mirrors the factual content of United States
v. Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom 15 ("Walters"), in which an Illinois
state court made an unprecedented decision, holding that sports agents
Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom conspired to commit and committed
mail fraud after signing student-athletes to representation contracts.'
6
The court's decision potentially brings aggressive agent behavior into the
realm of criminal conduct in instances where their initial act was not a
violation of any criminal legislation. 7
This note focuses upon the use of the federal mail fraud statute 8 as
a means of regulating agent behavior, specifically the behavior of Walters
and Bloom, who signed athletes to representation contracts before the
students' eligibility had expired. Additionally, this note will discuss the
problems which are present in the mail fraud statute as it exists today,
the misapplication of the mail fraud statute by the Walters court, and the
need for federal legislation to regulate sports agent conduct like that of
Walters and Bloom.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The student-athletes who contracted with Walters and Bloom were
members of NCAA Division I football teams. 9 The NCAA, the Mid-
American Athletic Conference, the Intercollegiate Big Ten Conference,
and individual colleges and universities each have their own regulations
governing the amateur status of student-athletes who are eligible to com-
pete in events sponsored by any one of these agencies. 20 These regula-
tions provide that a college athlete will be ineligible to participate in a
school's athletic program if he or she contracts to be represented by an
agent, accepts payment for participation in college athletics, is promised
compensation following the completion of his or her collegiate career, or
receives any financial assistance other than that administered by the
15. 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
16. Id.
17. Sobel, The Regulation Of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. at
783.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
19. The NCAA Division I is a voluntary association composed of major four-year colleges
and universities. Membership obligates the individual athletic departments to comply with
NCAA legislation and allows the departments to offer a limited number of full athletic schol-
arships. Woods and Mills, Tortious Interference With An Athletic Scholarship: A University's
Remedy For The Unscrupulous Agent, 40 ALA. L. REv. at 143 n.6 (1988).
20. NCAA CONST., art. 3 § 1.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
school and his or her family.21
Each year, universities require every student-athlete to sign and sub-
mit statements containing information relating to eligibility, amateur sta-
tus, and financial aid.22 The various schools use this information to
determine the athlete's eligibility to compete in the school's athletic pro-
gram and to receive one of a limited number of athletic scholarships the
school is allowed to distribute.2" The student-athletes who signed repre-
sentation contracts with Walters and Bloom were beneficiaries of such
scholarships.24
Walters and Bloom approached college football players offering
money and other inducements to sign representation contracts with
World Sports & Entertainment, Inc. ("WSE"), an entity of which Wal-
ters and Bloom were principal executive officers.25 Walters and Bloom
sought to sign the student-athletes to representation contracts while the
athletes were eligible to play and in the process of playing college football
for their respective universities.26 In the spring of 1986, Walters and
Bloom signed Robert Perryman and Garland Rivers of the University of
Michigan and Roderick Woodson of Purdue University to representation
contracts.27 To conceal this violation and help preserve the athletes' eli-
gibility, the agents postdated the contracts to take effect after the players'
amateur eligibility expired and they were to be drafted by professional
teams.28
In order to maintain their eligibility, the students who had con-
tracted with the agents filed false eligibility and financial statements with
their universities and with the NCAA.29 Early in the summer of 1986,
Michigan and Purdue offered Perryman, Rivers and Woodson scholar-
ships for the 1986-1987 school year, through a form entitled "Big Ten
Conference Tender of Financial Aid."3 The players all accepted the of-
fers of financial aid in August, 1986. 3" Both Michigan and Purdue re-
quired the students to complete forms entitled "Big Ten Statement of
Eligibility," "Big Ten Statement of Financial Support," and "NCAA
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. NCAA Bylaw 6-1-(a), reprinted in 1988-89 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COL-
LEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOcIATION, at 129 (1988).
24. United States v. Walters and Bloom, 711 F. Supp. at 1438 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
25. Id. at 1437.
26. Id.
27. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, United States v. Walters and Bloom (Nos. 89-2352, 2353).
28. Walters at 1437.
29. Id. at 1438.
30. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, United States v. Walters and Bloom, (Nos. 89-2352, 2353).
31. Id.
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Student-Athlete Statement" after they accepted the scholarship offers
from the schools.3 2 Michigan and Purdue administrators reviewed the
forms, created a separate document entitled "Certified Eligibility List"
and mailed both to the Big Ten Conference offices.33
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Holding
The Walters court held that Walters and Bloom committed mail
fraud under the federal statute34 by implementing a scheme to defraud
universities of tangible property, a scheme which was furthered by use of
the mails.3" The court found that Walters' and Bloom's fraudulent
scheme consisted of student-athletes signing both agent representation
forms and Statements of Eligibility and Statements of Financial Support,
which the students then mailed to their respective universities. 36 The
court ruled that the agents' scheme was executed when "particular stu-
dent-athletes obtained tangible property from their universities based on
fraudulent misrepresentations of material fact concerning the student-
athlete's eligibility status."
37
. Reasoning
The court reasoned that by having student-athletes sign representa-
tion contracts while bound by the rules and regulations of the NCAA,
Walters and Bloom caused the universities to rely upon false statements
in deciding whether to award scholarship money to various athletes.38
As a result, the Walters court determined that the universities were de-
frauded of this scholarship money and the right to distribute athletic
scholarships to those individuals who were eligible to compete on behalf
of the universities.39
The Walters court found that the scholarship money and the right to
distribute it constituted tangible property' and thus escaped the excep-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
35. 711 F. Supp. 1435.
36. Id. at 1439-40.
37. Id. at 1444.
38. Id. at 1438.
39. Id. at 1446.
40. 711 F. Supp. at 1443-44. The court defined scholarship money as room, board, and
fees. The right to distribute scholarships was defined as the university's right to control the
allocation of a limited number of athletic scholarships to student-athletes who the university
1990]
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tion established by McNally v. United States.4 In McNally, the Supreme
Court held that the federal mail fraud statute applies only when a party
is deprived of tangible property.42 The Walters court found that because
the universities were defrauded of tangible property, Walters and Bloom
committed mail fraud under the federal statute.43
The court found that Walters and Bloom used the mail system to
further their fraudulent scheme when the false statements were sent by
the universities to the NCAA." The Walters court, citing United States
v. Castor,45 held that a person "causes" a mailing either when he makes
use of the mails or when he causes someone else to do so.46 Thus, be-
cause the agents knew or should have known that the universities would
have to mail the documents to the NCAA, Walters and Bloom caused
the universities to mail the documents to the NCAA, thereby using the
mail system to bring their fraudulent scheme to fruition.47
The Walters court found that the agents' conduct fit within the defi-
nition of a "fraudulent mailing" under the federal mail fraud statute.48
The court in United States v. Wormick 49 stated:
[u]nder this definition, mailings made after the scheme has
reached its fruition are not in furtherance of the scheme (cita-
tion omitted) ... [o]n the other hand, mailings made to pro-
mote the scheme (citation omitted), or which relate to the
acceptance of the proceeds of the scheme (citation omitted), or
which facilitate concealment of the scheme (citation omitted),
have been found to have been in furtherance of the scheme
under this definition.5"
The Walters court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that the
mailings in this case are an essential part of the scheme because they
facilitate concealment of the scheme.5 The success of the agents' fraud-
considered to be eligible under the rules and regulations of the NCAA and the conference
which governs that school. Id.
41. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). The Court narrowed the application of U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) by
holding that it only applies to tangible property. Id. For a discussion on the student-athlete as
property of a university, see Woods and Mills, Tortious Interference With An Athletic Scholar-
ship: A University's Remedy For The Unscrupulous Agent, 40 ALA. L. REV. 141 (1988).
42. 383 U.S. 350 (1987).
43. 711 F. Supp. at 1445-46.
44. Id at 1440.
45. 558 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978).
46. Id. at 385.
47. 711 F. Supp. at 1440.
48. Id. at 1441.
49. 709 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1983).
50. Id. at 462.
51. 711 F. Supp. at 1440.
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ulent scheme depended upon the student-athletes' receipt of the scholar-
ship monies and the mailings allowed the students to receive this
money.52 Thus, based on Wormick, the Walters court held that the
agents' mailings were in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme because they
were an essential part of that scheme.53
IV. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
A. The Original Mail Fraud Statute
As originally enacted, the federal mail fraud statute served to deter
the actual and intentional misuse of the mails.54 This statute was com-
prised of three elements: 1) persons charged must have devised a scheme
or artifice to defraud; 2) they must have intended to effect this scheme by
opening or intending to open correspondence with some other person
through the post office establishment or by inciting such other person to
open communication with them; and 3) that in carrying out such scheme,
such person must have either deposited a letter or packet in the post
office, or taken or received one therefrom."
The original statute clearly contains mail-emphasizing language.
The statute makes reference to the misuse of the "post office establish-
ment"56 and requires punishment to be proportional to "the degree in
which the abuse of the post office establishment enters as an instrument
into such fraudulent scheme."" The mail-emphasizing language of the
original mail fraud statute was evidence of a congressional concern for
misuse of the mails and for prosecuting only those fraudulent schemes
52. Id. at 1441.
53. Id. at 1439-40.
54. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
55. Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1895).
56. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
57. Id. The original mail fraud statute reads:
That if any person being devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or com-
munication with any other person (whether resident within or outside the United
States), by means of the post-office establishment of the United States, or by inciting
such other person to open communication with the person so devising or intending,
shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting to do so), place any
letter or packet in any post-office of the United States, or take or receive any there-
from, such person, so misusing the post-office establishment, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred dollars,
with or without such imprisonment, as the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen
calendar months. The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge
offenses to the number of three when committed within the same six calendar
months; but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the
punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office establish-
ment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and device. Id.
1990]
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that involved such misuse."
B. The 1909 Amendment
At the turn of the century, concern turned from stemming misuse of
mails toward controlling fraud in general.59 In 1909, Congress amended
the mail fraud statute' and in doing so, eliminated the language which
demonstrated concern for abuse of the mails.6" In the absence of the
mail-emphasizing language, the amended statute focused on obtaining
money or property by false or fraudulent means.62 Since its amendment,
the sole purpose of the mail fraud statute has been to prosecute all types
of fraudulent conduct. The use of mails, no longer the nexus of the crime
of mail fraud, has served primarily as a basis for invoking federal juris-
diction.63 Courts have been able to fulfill this purpose because judges
have been free to interpret the statute very broadly. 4 As a result, the law
of mail fraud is generally judge-made.65
The language of the amended statute focuses upon obtaining prop-
erty, and the courts which interpret the statute have defined this lan-
guage broadly.66 Thus, the mail fraud statute applies to a wider
spectrum of illicit activity than it would had it been strictly construed.67
The amended statute is a result of Congress' concern for controlling un-
ethical business practices in a rapidly expanding business environment.6"
58. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 786 (1980).
59. United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
60. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130.
61. Id. As amended, the statute read in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises.., shall, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice
or attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed, any letter, postal card, package,
writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, whether addressed to any person resid-
ing within or outside the United States, in any post office, or station thereof, or street
or other letter box of the United States, or authorized depository for mail matter, to
be sent or delivered by the post office establishment of the United States, or shall take
or receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United States
... shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. Id.
62. Id.
63. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 816 (1980).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1979); United States v. Mandel, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), mandamus de-
nied, 445 U.S. 959 (1980); United States v. United Brands Co., No. 78 Crim. 538 (S.D.N.Y.
July 19, 1978).
65. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
66. See supra note 64.
67. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REV. at 772 (1980).
68. See supra note 46.
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Because of this legislation, the mail fraud statute is now an important
weapon against numerous types of fraud.69
C. The Modern Mail Fraud Statute
The modem mail fraud statute70 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or arti-
fice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or author-
ized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever
to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the
place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined
not more than $1000.00 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.71
The mail fraud statute currently consists of two elements which
must be satisfied to sustain a conviction: a scheme to defraud and the use
of the mails.72
1. Scheme To Defraud
The first element of the mail fraud statute is a "scheme to de-
fraud. ' ' 73 A "scheme to defraud," is defined as behavior calculated to
deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension. 74 This ele-
ment has two components: fraudulent intent and contemplation of harm
or injury.
The first component of a "scheme to defraud" is the intent to com-
mit a fraud.75 In order to sustain a mail fraud charge, the government
must show a scheme to defraud by proving that the defendant actually
69. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 406 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
71. 714 F.2d at 422 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)).
72. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
73. United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973).
74. United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1972). A further example is
$peigel v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 609 F. Supp. 1083 (D.C. Ill. 1985) in which the
court noted that fraudulent schemes typically involve covering up illicit acts through false
pretenses, failing to disclose material facts when there is some duty to do so, making false
statements or ones with reckless disregard to their truth. Id. at 1088.
75. United States v. Brickey, 296 F. Supp. 742, 747-48 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
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devised or intended to devise such a scheme.7 6 This component does not
focus upon conduct but on state of mind or scheme." Fraudulent intent
need not relate directly to the mailing itself; a defendant need not intend
that the mails be used, only that a fraudulent scheme be committed. 8
The second component of a "scheme to defraud" is the contempla-
tion of harm or injury.7 9 Such contemplation may be inferred when a
scheme has an injurious or harmful effect as a necessary result of its
execution. 0
2. Use Of The Mails
The second element necessary for a mail fraud conviction is causing
the use of the mails for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme.81
One causes the mails to be used when he or she acts with the knowledge
that use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or
where use of the mails can reasonably be foreseen even though not actu-
ally intended. 2 Numerous rules facilitate the prosecutor's burden of
proving the mailing element of the crime.8 3 For example, mailings need
not be either an essential part of the scheme, 4 actually effective in exe-
cuting the scheme,85 or actually conducted by the offender.86 An of-
fender must merely cause the use of the mails and must use the mails for
the purpose of executing the scheme.
8 7
The courts, however, have imposed limitations on the mailing ele-
ment of the statute. For example, letters mailed before the scheme is
conceived or after it is completed are not subject to the mail fraud statute
because a mailing made either before a scheme is conceived or after it has
reached fruition does not further the scheme and cannot support a mail
fraud conviction. 88 Despite these limitations, judicial latitude in apply-
76. United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311-12 (1st Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919
(1980).
77. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771 (1980).
78. Brickey at 747-48.
79. United States v. London, 753 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1905).
80. Id.
81. 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
82. Id. at 8-9.
83. Crumbaugh, Survey Of The Law Of Mail Fraud, 2 ILL. LAW FORuM 237, 248 (1975).
84. 296 F. Supp. at 747.
85. Newingham v. United States, 4 F.2d 490, 492 (3d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 703
(1925).
86. United States v. Castor, 558 F.2d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010
(1978).
87. 240 U.S. at 394.
88. 609 F. Supp. at 1090.
[Vol. 10
SPORTS AGENCY
ing the statute is virtually unrestrained. 9
V. ANALYSIS: APPLICATION OF THE MODERN
MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
The lack of a hard and fast rule for application of the mail fraud
statute has been criticized in the last decade. Jed Rakoff, a former fed-
eral prosecutor, has noted that "the idiosyncrasies of design and interpre-
tation that make the mail fraud statute so effective in combatting fraud
likewise render it more liable to irrational, unpredictable or extreme ap-
plications and hence, to abuse." 90
A. Drawbacks To Broad Interpretation
In recent years, the most controversial mail fraud cases have re-
volved around the statute's lack of a precise definition of a "scheme to
defraud." 9 While the vague concept of a "scheme to defraud" may
make the mail fraud statute an important law enforcement tool, it also
allows for abuse and for anomalous results because the statute can be
applied in a variety of unforeseeable and undesirable ways. 92 The result
of the lack of a precise definition of a "scheme to defraud" has been to
"extend the net of the federal criminal sanction over an extraordinarily
vast terrain and to arm the federal prosecutor with a weapon substan-
tially different in character from any previously known to the substantive
criminal law." 93 However, courts have been able to bypass the difficult
task of establishing a definition of "scheme to defraud" by reiterating the
mail-emphasizing language of the original statute.94
The re-emphasis of the mailing aspect of the statute has allowed
courts to avoid the real questions underlying most of the controversial
cases brought under the present mail fraud statute, most notably the pre-
89. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980).
90. Id. at 779.
91. Id. at 819.
92. Barbur, Mail Fraud And Free Speech, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 942, 952 (Nov. 1986). In his
article, Barbur includes a discussion of several cases in which courts used the mail fraud stat-
ute to curb free speech rights. Id. at 953 n.70. See also, In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz,
764 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 793 (1986) (the mail fraud
statute extended to breaches of fiduciary duty by public and private employees, even where no
monetary or property loss was threatened); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121-30
-(2d Cir. 1982) (affirming mail fraud conviction of Republican party country committee chair-
man for arranging kickbacks on public insurance commissions); United States v. George, 477
F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
93. Coffee, The Metastasis Of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story Of The Evolution Of A
White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
94. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REV. at 819.
1990]
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cise definition of a "scheme to defraud." 95 The Supreme Court found
that the common law development of the mail fraud statute has become
so unbounded that virtually any unethical conduct could be subject to its
penalty.96
Although many of the schemes prosecuted under the federal mail
fraud statute are devious, harmful, and otherwise reprehensible, such an
empirical observation is not consistent with the purpose the mail fraud
statute was designed to serve,97 that is, to control the fraudulent taking of
property by use of the postal system. 9 Federal prosecutors today em-
ploy the statute in situations that might have been inappropriate or even
bizarre only a few years ago.99
Modem courts have been unwilling to undertake the formidable
task of determining whether there are substantive limitations which may
be imposed on the term "scheme to defraud" in order to limit the stat-
ute's scope."o° Obviously, the only way to effectively limit the scope of
what is an overly broad application of the federal mail fraud statute is to
address the "scheme to defraud" language itself.'0°
VI. ERRORS OF THE WALTERS COURT
The Walters court erred in failing to define the terms of the statute
literally. Other courts have held that criminal statutes are to be defined
in their literal senses: "no person is to be made subject to penal statutes
by implication and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to
predominate in favor of the accused."' 02
In an analogous case, Abernethy v. State, °3 a sports agent appealed
his conviction for tampering with a sporting event."° The Abernethy
95. Id.
96. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
97. Hurson, Limiting The Federal Mail Fraud Statute - A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 423, 436 (1983).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
99. Hurson, Limiting The Federal Mail Fraud Statute - A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. at 425 (1983). For further examples of the expanding use of the mail fraud
statute see Dreeben, Insider Trading And Intangible Rights: The Redefinition Of The Mail
Fraud Statute, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181 (1988); Weintraub, Crime Of The Century: Use Of
The Mail Fraud Statute Against Authors, 67 B.U.L. REV. 507 (1987); Eskridge, Public Values
In Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (April 1989).
100. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. at 819 (1980).
101. "A concrete and comprehensive definition of the term 'scheme to defraud' is necessary
if the statute is to have meaningful and discernible limits." Hurson, Limiting The Federal Mail
Fraud Statute - A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423, 458 (1983).
102. Fuller v. State, 257 Ala. 502, 60 So.2d 202 (1952).
103. 545 So.2d 185 (Ala. Ct. App. 1988).
104. Id. at 186.
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court recognized that the applicable statute was being stretched to its
limits to bring the sports agent's conduct within its scope and found that
the agent's conviction must be reversed under a literal reading of the
statute because of the agent's lack of criminal intent.'05 The Walters
court, facing an analogous situation, came to a different and erroneous
result by failing to address the literal meaning of the statute. The Wal-
ters court must be reversed.
A. Walters And Bloom Do Not Have Requisite Scheme To Defraud
The first element of the mail fraud statute focuses upon the existence
of a scheme. An essential component of such a scheme is the intent to
defraud.'0 6 It is clear that Walters' and Bloom's conduct does not satisfy
the first requirement of the mail fraud statute because they did not have
an identifiable scheme to defraud the universities of tangible property.
1. Intent To Defraud
In Walters, there is no demonstrable fraudulent intent which is con-
sistent with an acceptable definition of a "scheme to defraud."'0 7 If a
viable definition of "scheme to defraud" is applied to the demonstrated
intent of Walters and Bloom, it is apparent that neither agent intended to
take or withhold the property of the universities.
The Supreme Court defines a scheme to defraud as "wronging one
in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes." 08 The Walters
court held that, in this case, the scholarship monies were a form of prop-
erty rights.'0 9 The Walters court acknowledged that the agents did not
scheme to obtain scholarships. "0 Therefore, it follows that Walters and
Bloom have not committed mail fraud under the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of a "scheme to defraud,""' because they did not scheme to wrong
the universities in their property rights. The agents' intent was to sign
the student-athletes to representation contracts, not to obtain scholarship
105. Id. at 190.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
107. The verb "to defraud" - the term actually used in the mail fraud statute - is predomi-
nantly used in the context of wrongdoing by misrepresentation. See WEBSTER'S THIRD IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 593 (1961) (defining "to defraud" as "to take or withhold from
one some possession, right, or interest by calculated misstatement or perversion of truth, trick-
ery, or other deception"). See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 511 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
108. 483 U.S. at 358 (1987).
109. 711 F. Supp. at 1444.
110. Id.
111. The Court stated that the term "usually signif[ies] the deprivation of something of
value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching (citation omitted)." 483 U.S. at 358 (1987).
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money from the universities." 2
It is uncontested that the agents' conduct was dishonest and unethi-
cal. Yet, the express language of the statute indicates that Congress did
not intend the definition of a "scheme to defraud" to be merely an intent
to injure or be dishonest."' The mail fraud statute does not forbid the
use of the mails in any "scheme to injure" or any "dishonest scheme" but
specifically and expressly forbids a "scheme to defraud.""' 4 While Wal-
ters and Bloom may be liable in a civil action by the schools for interfer-
ence with contractual or advantageous economic relations," 5 they did
not commit fraud under a literal reading of the statute.
1 16
Signing student-athletes to representation contracts does not consti-
tute behavior calculated to deprive the universities of money or property
by the use of deception. The agents' intent was to sign college athletes
before their eligibility expired. Dishonest as this may be, the agents did
not intend to receive nor did they actually receive any of the money of
which the universities claim to be defrauded.
2. Universities Were Not Deprived Of Tangible Property
As previously discussed," 7 the Walters court found that the scholar-
ship money and the right to distribute it constituted tangible property' 8
and thus escaped the exception established by McNally. 9 The Walters
court's finding is in error.
In Toulabi v. United States, 120 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found that an individual charged with furnishing prospective taxi drivers
with the answers to a taxi licensing test administered by the city of Chi-
cago did not deprive the city of a tangible property right by undercutting
its ability to decide who shall receive a taxi license. 12 ' The court found
that Chicago's right to taxi drivers who had passed the exam honestly
was not a property right.
122
Toulabi is directly analogous to the situation Walters and Bloom
face. However, the Walters court held that a similar right, the right to
112. 711 F. Supp. at 1437.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
114. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 805 (1980).
115. Woods and Mills, Tortious Interference With An Athletic Scholarship.: A University's
Remedy For The Unscrupulous Agent, 40 ALA. L. REV. 141 (1988).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
117. See supra text accompanying note 37.
118. 711 F. Supp. at 1439. See supra note 40.
119. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
120. 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 126.
122. Id.
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distribute scholarships, was a tangible property right. 23 The holdings of
Toulabi and Walters are inconsistent; the deprivation of the university's
right to allocate scholarships based upon accurate eligibility information
is no different than the deprivation of the city of Chicago's right to allo-
cate taxi licenses based upon honest test results. As Toulabi was an ap-
pellate decision in the same circuit as the Walters court, and the Toulabi
court reversed a conviction identical to that of Walters and Bloom, the
agents' convictions must similarly be reversed.
B. Use Of The Mails
Walters and Bloom did not use the mails to further a fraudulent
scheme. Upon close investigation it is apparent that the evidence in Wal-
ters also fails to satisfy the second element of the mail fraud statute as the
agents' use of the mails was not in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.
In Parr v. United States,'24 the Supreme Court held that a scheme is
executed when a defendant receives the money or goods which are the
object of his scheme.' 25 Walters and Bloom signed the student-athletes
to representation contracts before the players submitted the false docu-
ments. Thus, the object of their scheme was realized before the mails
were used. 126 It is well-founded that letters mailed after a scheme has
been completed are not subject to the federal mail fraud statute.
27
C. True Fraud Perpetrators: Student-Athletes
A literal reading of the terms of the mail fraud statute reveals that
only the players are possible perpetrators of mail fraud. The Walters
court found that a fraudulent scheme existed in which ineligible' 28 stu-
dent-athletes signed and mailed falsified Statements of Eligibility and
Statements of Financial Support and subsequently received undeserved
scholarships from the universities.' 29 Based on this reasoning, holding
Bloom and Walters criminally liable is incorrect because the students
falsified the documents, mailed them to the universities, and obtained
tangible property, in the form of scholarship money, from the universities
123. 711 F. Supp. at 1444.
124. 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
125. Id. at 393.
126. 711 F. Supp. at 1437.
127. Newingham v. United States, 4 F.2d 490, 491 (3d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 703
(1925).
128. The athletes were ineligible because they had signed representation contracts. See
supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
129. 711 F. Supp. at 1438-40.
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based on these fraudulent documents.1 30
Under the literal application of the mail fraud statute, the players
possessed the requisite intent to deceive the universities in order to obtain
scholarship money, thus satisfying the scheme to defraud element of the
mail fraud statute.1 31 In addition, the players used the mails to further
this scheme to defraud as the mailings allowed the players to receive the
scholarship money, thus satisfying the statute's mailing element.132 The
logical conclusion of Walters, given the court's definition of the fraudu-
lent scheme, is to find the players guilty of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
Scholars have pointed out that it is often the case that federal prose-
cutors' use of the mail fraud statute is the result of the fact that there is
simply no other recourse available to them. 133 Prosecutors often find
that a defendant's conduct amounts to improper or dishonest activity but
does not fit the traditional criteria for a federal offense. 134 Mail fraud is
frequently the only federal criminal charge available to bring against a
private individual involved in corrupt activity.1 35 Prosecutors are espe-
cially prone to applying the mail fraud statute when combatting newly
developing areas of fraud where Congress has been slow to enact specific
prohibitory legislation. 136 As the agent profession in general, and sports
agency in particular, has realized substantial growth over the past
twenty-five years, it clearly falls within the newly developing areas in
which the mail fraud statute is liberally applied.
A. The Agency Profession In General
The Walters decision potentially brings aggressive agents in any in-
dustry within the scope of the federal mail fraud statute. 137 As one au-
thor notes, the courts have:
brought within the ambit of the federal mail fraud statute virtu-
ally the entire range of commercial activity in this country. Al-
130. Id. at 1444.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
133. Hurson, Limiting The Federal Mail Fraud Statute - A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 423, 434 (1983).
134. Id. at 435.
135. Id.
136. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980).
137. Agents are frequently used in the entertainment industry for purposes of negotiation
and money management, see supra note 4.
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most any action undertaken by a fiduciary, agent or employee
which causes detriment to his beneficiary, principal, or em-
ployer and which involves some material deception, will likely
trigger a responsibility to make disclosure. Failure to disclose
will be construed as a breach of fiduciary duty and subject the
actor to federal prosecution for mail fraud.' 8
Such application of the statute will force agents to become more cautious
and to curtail interaction with clients in order to avoid federal prosecu-
tion. If agents are forced to practice in this manner, their effectiveness as
advocates of their client's best interests is greatly diminished.
B. Sports Agency In Particular
The incredible growth of sports agency has forced professional and
amateur athletics alike to attempt to regulate the activity of the agents. 39
In the professional realm, player agents are accepted as a permanent,
highly visible, and occasionally beneficial element in the sports labor rela-
tions process.' 40 However, at the amateur level, sports agents are often
seen as a threatening element to both the integrity and the financial well-
being of college athletic programs. 4 '
As neither agents nor student-athletes are members of the NCAA,
the NCAA has no authority to regulate player agents either directly or
through student-athletes.' 42 The current NCAA regulations remove a
registered agent from a registration list if he or she acts to jeopardize the
student-athlete's eligibility by signing a representation contract with the
athlete. 14  Nothing in these regulations forbids student-athletes from
hiring agents who are unregistered or even "deregistered" because of a
rule violation.'" The NCAA's sanctioning power is only effective over
athletes and colleges, not over agents.145 In an attempt to regulate agent
activity, the NCAA has desperately resorted to criminal statutes which
are subject to broad interpretation by the courts. The mail fraud statute
138. Hurson, Limiting The Federal Mail Fraud Statute - A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 423, 429 (1983).
139. Sobel, The Regulation Of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. at
703-05 (1987).
140. Id. at 709.
141. Id. at 710.
142. Id. at 728.
143. Id. at 730.
144. See Dunn, Regulation Of Sports Agents, supra note 5, at 1042, citing letter from the
NCAA to "Individuals Acting in the Capacity of Player Agent" (September 11, 1985) (dis-
cussing "1985-1986 Player Agent Registration Program").
145. Id. See supra text accompanying note 141 for discussion of NCAA's sanctioning
power.
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used in Walters is an example of this misguided attempt at control, as the
statute was stretched beyond a reasonable application in this case.
Clearly, the broad application which the Walters court gave the stat-
ute has its drawbacks. The danger in the newly-expanded scope of the
mail fraud statute lies in the possibility that federal prosecutors will se-
lect prosecutions for political or other illegitimate motives. 46 With the
development of college athletics as a big business, large universities are
apt to protect their investments in student-athletes by any means avail-
able. Without specific federal legislation, sports agents' conduct will be
susceptible to haphazard criminal prosecution.
1. The Need For Federal Legislation
A number of state legislators have attempted to regulate the conduct
of sports agents. 47 However, all of these attempts have proven ineffec-
tive in providing protection for the athletes and uniform guidelines for
the agents. '
48
Existing legislative attempts at regulation cover all agents and all
sports and each state has statutory authority to impose criminal sanc-
tions and enforce regulatory measures.' However, this state-by-state
legislation is rendered ineffective by severe limitations in their scope and
jurisdictional reach.' 50 Because sports agency is an interstate profession,
state-by-state legislation has proved to be confusing, burdensome and in-
consistent.'' Federal regulation would eliminate the jurisdictional limi-
tations inherent in state legislation by governing agents on a nationwide
scale, a scale consistent with the manner in which agents operate.
5 2
Primarily, federal legislation would create uniformity in the law
governing agents, eliminating jurisdictional battles between states and
confusion on the part of agents and athletes as to the laws of a particular
146. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 144 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winters, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying note 91.
147. The states which presently have legislation regulating sports agents are California
(Athlete Agencies Act, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-47 (West Supp. 1987)); Oklahoma (The
Oklahoma Athlete Agent Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62 (A) (1) - (2) (West 1986));
and Texas (TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (Vernon Supp. 1988)). Other states are
presently contemplating legislation to regulate sports agents. Among these are Nebraska, Illi-
nois, Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona and Tennessee.
See Dunn, Regulation Of Sports Agents, supra note 5, at 1065.
148. See Dunn, Regulation Of Sports Agents, supra note 5.
149. Id. at 1057.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1065.
152. See Dunn, Regulation Of Sports Agents, supra note 5, at 1065.
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forum.15 3 In addition, federal legislation would replace the multiple ap-
plication and fee requirements of a state-by-state legislative scheme with
one application and one fee to the federal government. 
1 54
Only federal legislation will provide an effective means of control-
ling agent behavior. A federal measure addressing the regulation of
sports agents would abolish the jurisdictional ambiguities and substantive
inconsistencies of the existing state legislation while possessing the en-
forcement power of federal legislation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Under a literal reading of the federal mail fraud statute, Norby Wal-
ters and Lloyd Bloom did not commit mail fraud. The agents lacked a
"scheme to defraud," did not deprive the universities of tangible prop-
erty, and did not use the mails to further a fraudulent scheme. A literal
reading of the statute is required in this case because the courts' interpre-
tation of the statute has grown too broad. This broad application of the
statute allows prosecutors to bring a much wider range of conduct within
the ambit of criminal conduct but the statute also becomes subject to use
for political motives and, hence, to abuse.
While a more precise application of the mail fraud statute will en-
sure more uniform application, it will not suffice to regulate the activities
of sports agents like Walters and Bloom. The solution to the pressing
problem of agent regulation lies in federal legislation. Through such leg-
islation, agents, their clients and their client's employer or university will
be apprised of the "rules of the game." Each party will know what his or
her rights and responsibilities are and what the consequences of breaking
the rules will be. This sort of uniform code of conduct is a vast improve-
ment over the existing system where agents must play a "guessing game"
in conducting their search for clients, and the results of playing the game
can have unexpected and disastrous results.
Mark C. Goodman *
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1066. See Id. at 1041-63 for a discussion of the fee and bond requirements of the
various states which presently have regulatory legislation.
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